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6.1 Introduction
Perhaps the most important advance in the monetary policy literature
over the past twenty years is the explicit recognition that policy behav-
ior is purposeful and responds endogenously to the state of the econ-
omy. Substantial progress has been made by research that examines
how various monetary policy rules perform in dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) models. A prominent example of such a rule is
Taylor's (1993) rule, which has the central bank adjust the short-term
nominal interest rate in response to fluctuations in inflation and some
measure of output. Rare is the paper now that posits an exogenous pro-
cess for money growth and claims to offer practical policy advice.
A substantial line of empirical work finds that Taylor's or other simple
rules describing purposeful behavior display important time varia-
tion in the United States (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000; Lubik and
Schorfheide 2004; Favero and Monacelli 2005; and Sims and Zha 2006).
Although particulars vary, a common theme across much of the empir-
ical work on time variation in policy behavior is that changes in policy
behavior are exogenous. Recent work embeds Markov switching pro-
cesses for policy in DSGE models to interpret these empirical findings
(Chung, Davig, and Leeper 2007; Davig and Leeper 2006,2007).
1
Because both the empirical and theoretical work on regime change
treat the changes as exogenous, in an important sense the work is in-
consistent with a central tenet underlying the Taylor rule: monetary pol-
icy behavior is purposeful and reacts systematically to changes in the
macroeconomic environment. This chapter makes regime change en-
dogenous, taking a step toward resolving this inconsistency.
2
We distinguish two types of effects from exogenous disturbances.
3 Di-
rect effects are the usual impacts of shocks that arise when agents place346 Davig and Leeper
zero probability on regime change, corresponding to a fixed regime
setup. Expectations formation effects arise whenever agents rational ex-
pectations of future regime change induce them to alter their expecta-
tions functions. Expectations formation effects are the difference be-
tween the impact of a shock when regime can change and the impact
when regime is forever fixed.
The chapter shows that even very simple threshold-style methods for
endogenizing regime changes can generate rich dynamics. The rich dy-
namics allow models that are linear, except for policy behavior, to dis-
play three features that connect to theoretical and empirical work on the
impacts of shocks and to observations about how central banks act:
(1) Expectations formation effects generated by the possibility of
regime change can be quantitatively important.
(2) Symmetric policy shocks can produce asymmetric effects.
(3) Preemptive policy behavior enhances the effectiveness of policy ac-
tions and delivers a quantitatively significant preemption dividend.
Endogenous switching shares the feature of quantitatively important
expectations formation effects with exogenous switching. Davig and
Leeper (2007) emphasize that if monetary policy switches exogenously
between a more active and a less active reaction against inflation, agents'
expectations and (therefore) the equilibrium outcomes always reflect
the possibility that regime can change in the future. For example, expec-
tations of a more active policy regime in the future diminish the impacts
of shocks on current inflation, even when the current regime is less ac-
tive.
Features (2) and (3) emerge with threshold endogenous switching,
but are absent when regimes switch exogenously.
The second feature connects to a growing body of empirical evidence
suggesting that typical macroeconomic shocks—such as oil prices, gov-
ernment spending, or nominal aggregate demand—have nonlinear ef-
fects on the economy (DeLong and Summers 1988; Cover 1992; Hooker
and Knetter 1996; Hooker 2002; Ravn and Sola 2004; Choi and Devereux
2005; and Cologni and Manera 2006). Some asymmetric effects have
been attributed to nonlinearities in the structure of the economy, such as
real and nominal rigidities or changes in availability of financing over
the business cycle (Akerlof and Yellen 1985; Ball and Romer 1990; Ball
and Mankiw 1994; Bernanke and Gertler 1989,1995; and Gertler 1992).
Surico (2003, 2006) estimates central bank preferences and finds evi-Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 347
dence of asymmetric loss functions at the Federal Reserve, at the Euro-
pean Central Bank, and (prior to monetary union) at the Bundesbank.
Asymmetric policy preferences also underlie the opportunistic disinfla-
tion argument of Orphanides and Wilcox (2002). In this paper, all asym-
metries arise from nonlinearities in the monetary policy process. Non-
linearities stem from discrete shifts in policy rules that are triggered by
changes in the state of the economy.
The third feature arises from the emphasis central bankers place
on the intrinsic forward looking nature of monetary policymaking
(Bernanke 2004). Because of lags in when monetary policy actions affect
real activity and inflation, central banks need to act before economic
conditions deteriorate. A famous instance of forward looking policy oc-
curred in 1994 when the Federal Reserve moved preemptively against
increases in inflation that had only begun to show up in long-term bond
yields. Goodfriend (2005) concludes that the preemptive strike was suc-
cessful, as inflation remained low and long rates declined. Preemptive
actions of this sort, while playing a central role in central bank thinking,
have not been extensively modeled.
4
This chapter applies a simple framework to implement endogenous
monetary policy regime switching. When the central bank's target vari-
ables cross specified thresholds, the policy rule changes. One policy
process posits that if at date t - 1 inflation is less than some threshold
(TT*), policy obeys a usual Taylor rule at t; if inflation equals or exceeds
IT*, the central bank implements a more aggressive stance at t.
On the surface, this setup may seem deterministic: given current in-
flation, the next period's regime is known exactly. But threshold switch-
ing makes forming rational expectations of regimes two or more periods
in the future nontrivial, as they depend on the joint distribution of all the
exogenous disturbances and on the structure of the economy. Because
expectations of all future regimes are updated each period to incorpo-
rate news about realizations of shocks, threshold switching is a special
case of a Markov process with endogenous time varying probabilities.
The examples of endogenous switching presented herein connect
well to the behavior of inflation targeting central banks. Strict inflation
targeting, which is far more prominent in academic discussions than in
actual central banking, lines up with a threshold inflation rate (IT*) that
triggers shifts in the policy rule. Flexible inflation targeting, which many
central banks claim to pursue, involves more complex triggers that de-
pend on both the threshold inflation rate and some measure of the out-
put gap.348 Davig and Leeper
As applied to inflation targeting, endogenous switching departs from
the usual linear-quadratic framework, by embedding the notion that the
central bank has asymmetric preferences over its objectives, a possibil-
ity that Blinder (1997) discusses. If central bankers would prefer to be
twenty-five basis points below their inflation target than above it, this
can create a left skewed distribution of equilibrium inflation.
This chapter fits firmly into the literature that studies how DSGE
models perform under various ad hoc policy rules, such as Taylor rules.
That literature adopts the perspective that policy seeks second-best
rules, rather than optimal rules, perhaps because the underlying exoge-
nous shocks are not observed and uncertainty about the economy pre-
vents them from being accurately inferred from observable time series.
Second-best rules make policy choices a function of observables, like in-
flation and output, which the central bank aims to target.
Section 6.2 briefly compares various specifications of monetary pol-
icy—fixed regime, exogenous switching, and endogenous switching.
Threshold switching in a flexible price model of inflation determination
is used in sections 6.3 and 6.4 to illustrate the expectations formation
effects and asymmetric distributions that endogenous switching gener-
ates. Section 6.4 details how agents form rational expectations, develop-
ing a time varying probabilities interpretation of regime change. Sec-
tion 6.5 embeds threshold switching in the workhorse new Keynesian
model and displays the impacts of aggregate supply shocks on inflation
and output dynamics. The implications of a more plausible characteri-
zation of monetary policy behavior—in which both inflation and output
thresholds determine the policy rule—are also laid out. Section 6.6 com-
bines a dynamic threshold—involving past, current, and expected in-
flation—with a hybrid new Keynesian model to show how central
banks might preemptively strike against inflation. In a calibrated ver-
sion of the model, preemptive policy behavior is shown to enhance the
effectiveness of policy actions, delivering a quantitatively significant
preemption dividend. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Quick Overview of Endogenous Regime Change
Monetary policy rules, such as Taylor's, are state-contingent in the sense
that the policy interest rate adjusts to the state of the economy, where a
fixed set of parameters govern the degree of adjustment. In an environ-
ment with endogenous regime switching, the policy rule is state-Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 349
contingent in this conventional sense, but also in a broader sense.
Namely, the parameters governing the degree of adjustment of the in-
terest rate to economic variables are themselves a function of the eco-
nomic state. For example, high rates of inflation may be particularly
alarming to policy makers and trigger a systematically more aggressive
response to inflation than in states with more benign rates of inflation.
To understand endogenous switching, it is useful to review fixed
regime and exogenous switching specifications of policy behavior. Con-
sider the simplified Taylor rule:
it = K + OLTTt + £f/ (1)
where it is the short-term nominal interest rate controlled by the central
bank, irt is the inflation rate, and et ~ i.i.d. N(0, cr
2) is an exogenous pol-
icy disturbance. This rule is state-contingent in the sense that the nomi-
nal interest rate adjusts to the inflation rate, which itself is a function of
the underlying state vector describing the economy. However, the sys-
tematic component of policy (a) is constant. All deviations of it from K +
aut are folded into the exogenous shock.
An exogenously switching rule extends this framework to:
it = K(S,) + a(S,K + et/ (2)
where St is a discrete valued random variable that evolves stochastically
and independently of the endogenous economic variables. Now mone-
tary policy is a set of different rules of the form in equation (1), with a
stochastic process governing the dynamic evolution of the rules. This
makes the policy rule rather than just the policy instrument (the interest
rate) state-contingent. In both equations (1) and (2), the parameters K
and a are given exogenously. The key difference between the two spec-
ifications is that equation (2) introduces a new source of disturbance to
the economy (the process governing St) with important implications for
expectations formation.
A simple example of endogenous switching makes the parameters of
the monetary policy rule functions of lagged endogenous variables, as
in:
it = K(TT(_,) + a(i7t_1)TTt + et, (3)
where the monetary rule (again) is state-contingent, except that the state
is now a lagged endogenous variable. As implemented in this paper, en-350 Davig and Leeper
dogenous switching can make the functions K(-) and a(-) either deter-
ministic or stochastic functions of irt_v
Evidently, there is no sharp conceptual distinction between endoge-
nous regime change and nonlinear policy rules. The former is a discrete
approximation to the latter. Discreteness may have some practical ad-
vantages to a central bank that seeks to communicate clearly about its
policy actions: it is far easier to inform the public about two distinct pol-
icy stances—normal and tight, for instance—than about the continuum
of responses implied by a response to inflation that is a continuous func-
tion of the inflation rate. Discreteness also serves a pedagogical purpose
since it lends itself to sharper interpretations of the resulting equilibria.
6.3 The Monetary Policy Process
We assume a monetary policy process that permits the monetary au-
thority to vary its response to contemporaneous inflation, depending on
the state of the economy. For example, a monetary authority may re-
spond systematically more aggressively when inflation exceeds a par-
ticular threshold, and less aggressively when inflation is below the
threshold.
5
When the threshold depends on lagged inflation, the monetary au-
thority sets the nominal interest rate using the rule:
6
h =
 astvt + lSt
xt> (4)
where xt is a measure of the output gap. The coefficients on inflation and
the output gap are functions of the inflation threshold (IT*), and lagged
inflation:
aS( = [1 - I(-nt_x > Tr*)]a0 + Ifr,^ > ir*]ai/ (5)
lst = [1 - /(TT^ > TT*)]7o + JK_a > ir*]7l/ (6)
where /[•] is the indicator function.
7 In sections 6.5 and 6.6, more so-
phisticated specifications that incorporate the output gap into the
threshold and thresholds that depend on expected inflation are consid-
ered. In all cases, the monetary policy process incorporates a state-
contingent systematic component of policy, so the interest rate rule used
to implement policy varies with economic conditions. This represents
the point of departure from simple instrument rules in which the sys-
tematic response of policy is invariant across time and states.Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 351
6.4 A Fisherian Model of Inflation
A simple model of inflation determination combines a standard Fisher
equation with an interest rate rule for monetary policy. The Fisher equa-
tion can be derived from a perfectly competitive endowment economy
with flexible prices and a one period nominal bond. A linearized asset
pricing equation for the nominal bond is given by:
it = Etirf+1 + Etrl+l, (7)
where rt denotes the real rate at t. The real rate evolves exogenously ac-
cording to:
rt = prt_x + vt, (8)
where 0 ^ p < 1, and vt is an independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) random variable with a doubly truncated normal distribution
with a mean of zero, variance of cr^, and symmetric truncation points.
In the special fixed regime case where a0 = ax = a > 1 in equation (5),
equilibrium inflation is uniquely determined by:
ir, = -?—rr (9)
a — p
As a increases, the effect of real rate shocks on inflation declines and
monetary policy increasingly offsets the influence of real rate shocks.
6.4.1 Threshold Switching Monetary Policy Regimes
The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate using
a0TTf if TTt_1 < TT*
I. =
if TTt_1 > TT*
(10)
where and a2 > a0 > 1. Monetary policy is active in both regimes, and
more active when Trtl > TT*. We normalize the threshold to be TT* = 0.
Monetary policy adopts a different rule with probability one every time
lagged inflation crosses the inflation threshold. If lagged inflation does
not cross the threshold, then the instrument rule switches with proba-
bility zero. We refer to this monetary policy as threshold switching,
based on the time series literature on self-exciting threshold autoregres-
sive models, in which lagged values of a variable can induce a change in352 Davig and Leeper
regime (Ghaddar and Tong 1981). Monetary policy self-excites in this
sense by influencing inflation, which itself determines future policy
regimes.
In this model and all subsequent variants, private agents form ra-
tional expectations based on complete information regarding the policy
making process. At date t they observe all current and past variables; to
form expectations, they incorporate the effects that shocks have on the
probability distribution over the policy rules. As section 6.4.4 explains,
although at date t agents know regime at t + 1 with certainty, this does
not imply that they know all future regimes because the sequence of
regimes that is realized depends on the sequence of realizations of ex-
ogenous shocks (vt) and the serial correlation properties of the real in-
terest rate process.
6.4.2 Equilibrium Characteristics
Let @f denote the state at date t. The solution to the model is a function
that maps the minimum set of state variables (®t = [rt, TT^J) into values
for the endogenous variable (irf).
All the models in this chapter are solved numerically using the mon-
otone map algorithm, which finds a fixed point in decision rules. The al-
gorithm uses a discretized state space, and requires a set of initial deci-
sion rules that reduce to a set of nonlinear expectational difference
equations. Details of the numerical method appear in the Appendix.
With threshold regime change, a positive real rate shock raises infla-
tion (as it does in a fixed regime), but the magnitude differs due to how
agents formulate expectations of future inflation. With a fixed regime,
agents know that monetary policy will respond symmetrically next pe-
riod to real rate shocks regardless of the sign of the shock. Threshold
regime switching induces agents to expect a stronger monetary policy
response next period, whenever a positive real rate shock pushes infla-
tion above its threshold.
To build intuition, it is helpful to consider a policy process that makes
the two regimes very different: a0 = 1.5 and a1 = 25. This extreme ex-
ample has policy adjusting the nominal rate very aggressively when in-
flation exceeds its threshold. In states where lagged inflation is below its
threshold, the monetary authority still adjusts the nominal rate more
than one-for-one with inflation, but to a degree more in line with con-
ventional Taylor rule specifications.
In purely forward looking models with simple policy processes, likeEndogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 353
equation (10), regimes inherit their persistence from the real interest rate
process. We make the real rate relatively serially correlated by setting p
= 0.9.
Figure 6.1 reports the contemporaneous response surface for inflation
as a function of the state—lagged inflation and the current real rate.
States where lagged inflation exceeds its threshold trigger the more ag-
gressive policy that almost completely offsets the effect of a real rate
shock on inflation. This in evident in the figure from the nearly flat por-
tion of the shaded surface when TTW ^ 0. States where lagged inflation is
below the threshold trigger the less active policy, and real rate shocks
have larger impacts on inflation, as shown in the left panels of the figure.
Turning to more plausible policies, consider the baseline policy a0 =
1.5 and aT = 3. Figure 6.1 illustrates the response surface in comparison
to the extreme example. The policy response, when inflation exceeds its
threshold, is not as aggressive in the baseline policy, which allows real
rates to have a larger impact on inflation. The figure also illustrates how
expectations affect current inflation. When inflation is less than its




Real rate shock (vt) Inflation (7t(1)
Figure 6.1
Contemporaneous response surface for inflation as a function of past inflation and cur-
rent real rate shock in a Fisherian model.
Note: Less active regime is a0 = 1.5; more active regime is a: = 3 (white surface) or 04 = 25
(shaded surface).354 Davig and Leeper
ever, the response surfaces differ because (in the extreme case) agents in-
corporate the fact that a large real rate shock will cause inflation to ex-
ceed its threshold in the future and trigger the more aggressive policy
response. Thus (in the extreme case), positive real rate shocks have a
smaller contemporaneous impact on inflation, even though both poli-
cies are responding with equal magnitude to current inflation. Much
tighter future policy creates expectations formation effects that attenu-
ate the increase in current inflation.
Figure 6.2 illustrates a slice of the response surface for given rates of
lagged inflation. When lagged inflation is below its threshold (irf_1 =
-0.2), the less active monetary policy is in place in the current period. A
large positive real rate shock, however, can cause agents to expect more
aggressive policy in the subsequent period. Consequently, the contem-
poraneous response of inflation has a kink at the point where a real rate
shock triggers this shift in expectations. The positive real rate shock in-
creases inflation, but by not as much as under the less active fixed
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Figure 6.2
Contemporaneous inflation response to a real rate shock in a Fisherian model
Note: Threshold switching, ir,^ = -.2 (solid line) and TT, a = .2 (dotted-dashed line) and
fixed regime with less active (a0 = 1.5) and more-active (a, = 3).Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 355
equilibrium. Expectations formation effects show up as the distance be-
tween the o's (the fixed regime model with a = 1.5) and the solid line (the
switching model with a0 = 1.5 in place). This distance arises from the ex-
pectation of tighter policy next period, not from any difference between
current policy stances.
Figure 6.3 corresponds to the impulse response evidence other stud-
ies have found for asymmetric impacts of macro shocks. The figure re-
ports responses of inflation to one time negative and positive real rate
shocks of equal magnitude. For reference, it also reports responses for
fixed regimes that are less active (dashed lines) and more active (dotted-
dashed lines). Monetary policy is initially in the more active regime. Fol-
lowing the positive shock, inflation rises and the more active regime
stays in place. Since the more active policy is in place for both the posi-
tive and negative shocks in period one, the positive shock has a smaller
absolute impact because agents expect to stay in the more active regime
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Figure 6.3
Responses of inflation to positive and negative real rate shocks in a Fisherian model
Note: Threshold switching (solid lines) and fixed regime less-active (dashed lines) and
fixed regime more active (dotted-dashed lines).356 Davig and Leeper
keep inflation above threshold. The negative shock lowers inflation and
causes policy to switch to the less active regime in period two; agents ex-
pectations adjust to reflect the greater likelihood that this regime stays
in place in future periods. The change in expectations and less active
policy do less to offset the negative shock, so inflation displays a more
persistent deviation from its threshold than following a positive shock.
6.4.3 Asymmetric Distributions
As the impulse responses imply, threshold switching creates an asym-
metric distribution of inflation. The fixed regime model with normal
shocks implies a symmetric normal distribution. Under exogenous
regime switching, the distribution for inflation is a mixture of the two
conditional distributions in each regime, where each conditional distri-
bution is normal. With endogenous switching, the distribution is
skewed to reflect that low or negative inflation rates are more likely to
occur than high inflation rates. For illustration, figure 6.4 reports three
histograms for different values of the Taylor coefficient in the regime
where inflation exceeds its threshold. A very aggressive response, ax =
25 (top panel), produces a severely left skewed distribution whose tail
extends into rates of inflation far below threshold. As a1 declines, the de-
gree of skewness also declines, but is still apparent in the case where
a1 = 3. The skewness is eliminated as al —»a0.
Skewness arises from the expectations formation effects generated by
the monetary policy process. The less active monetary policy is rela-
tively accommodating of shocks in states where inflation is below its
threshold and policy is anticipated to remain less active, so a negative
shock to the real rate transmits through to inflation to a larger extent
than when inflation is above its threshold. In contrast, when a shock
raises inflation above its threshold and triggers an expected switch to
the more active policy, the impacts on inflation are dampened.
6.4.4 Time-Varying Probabilities of Switching
Although the threshold switching setup employed implies that agents
know the regime one period in advance, agents' expectations formation
is nontrivial because they do not know all future regimes. The sequence
of regimes that is realized depends on the sequences of exogenous
shocks that are realized, and on the serial correlation properties of those
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Figure 6.4
Distribution of inflation in a Fisherian model
Note: Threshold switching with less active regime a0 = 1.5 and various settings of more-
active regime.
pectations in this environment, clarifying the nature of expectations for-
mation in the face of threshold switching of policy regimes.
In a state where the real rate shock is zero and inflation equals its
threshold, agents know that the more aggressive regime will be in place
next period because TT,^ ^ 0. Forming expectations two periods ahead
requires agents to compute the probability that (in the following period)
a shock will hit, which causes inflation to fall and policy authorities to
adopt the less active regime.
The probability of future regimes can be characterized precisely. The
solution for inflation as a function of the minimum set of state variables,
@t = (rt, TT^), can be expressed as:
(11)358 Davig and Leeper
The smallest vt, which is the innovation in the process for the real rate
shock, necessary to induce St+1 = 1 (the state with more aggressive pol-
icy) is given by the solution to:
min /z
7r[prf_1 + vt, h^r^, irf_2)]s.t. IT, ^ 0.
The objective function is /^(r,, TT^J, which is increasing in vt, so the min-
imization problem simply finds the smallest innovation to the shock
process that creates non negative inflation at time t. The probability of
Sf+1 = 1 is then:
t_1] = j\<\>(v;<jl)dv, (12)
vt
where v is the positive truncation point, v* is the solution to the mini-
mization problem, and ©f_1 includes all information at time t-1 (which
includes iTt_1 and, therefore, St). The integral in equation (12) gives the
probability of realizing a shock at t, vt ^ vf, whose value is sufficiently
large to induce St+1 = 1.
To build intuition, consider an example. The economy is in its deter-
ministic steady-state at date t - 2, so iTt_2 = rt_2 = 0, which puts policy
in the more active regime (St_a = 1). Given the realization of vt_v regime
at t is known, and Pr [St = 1 @t_J is a step function: if vt_x ^ 0, then
ir^ > 0, and Pr[Sf = 11 ©t_J = 1; whereas if vt_x < 0, then ir^ < 0, and Pr[St = i|ew] = o.
Regime at t + 1, however, is not so easily deduced. Because the real
rate shock is positively serially correlated, vt_x < 0 creates low inflation at
t-1 and at future dates. To trigger a regime change, the innovation at t
must be both positive and large enough to offset the persistent negative
effects on inflation of the previous shock. Evidently, the smaller the neg-
ative shock at t - 1, the more likely it is that the shock at t will push in-
flation over the threshold and make St+l = 1.
The minimization problem for this example becomes:
min /z
7r[ppf_1 + vt, h*(yt_v O)]s.t. TT( > 0.
vt
Two parameters are critical to the solution of this problem—p, which
governs the degree of serial correlation of the real interest rate, and av
the strength of the policy reaction to inflation in the more active regime.
8
Figure 6.5 plots Pr[Sf+11 ©t_J as a function of the innovation to the real
rate at t - 1, for various degrees of serial correlation (p). The figure isEndogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 359
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Figure 6.5
Probability of S,+1 = 1
Note: Conditional on information at t-1, ®t_t = (rH/ TT(_2), as function of the real interest rate shock at t - 1, for various values of the serial correlation of the exogenous shock p.
Drawn for a0 = 1.5 and a: = 3.
drawn for a0 = 1.5 and c^ = 3. When the shock is (i.i.d., p = 0), regime is
also i.i.d., changing each time a shock of a different sign is realized.
9 Re-
gardless of the realization of vt_v there is a fifty-fifty chance of either the
less active or the more active regime at t + 1 (dotted line). As the real rate
becomes more persistent, if vt^ > 0, the probability of switching to the
less active regime declines because it is less likely that a shock at t will
be sufficiently large and negative to offset the serially correlated in-
crease in inflation from the date t-1 positive shock. As the figure shows,
for a given realization of vt_v the probability of staying in the more ac-
tive regime rises monotonically with p. This is a manifestation of the ex-
pectations formation effects.
Expectations formation effects also increase with the strength of the
monetary policy reaction to inflation in the more active regime. Figure
6.6 plots Pr[St+1 ©f_J as a function of the innovation to the real rate at
t-1, for various values of aa (the Taylor coefficient in the more active
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Figure 6.6
Probability of S(+1 = 1
Note: Conditional on information at t - 1, &tl = (rtv TT(_2), as function of the real interest
rate shock at t -1, for various values of the Taylor parameter in the more active regime, av
Drawn for a0 = 1.5 and p = . 9.
ization of vt_1 > 0, the probability of staying in the more active regime
from period t to period t + 1 falls monotonically with ar Put differently,
as aa rises, monetary policy offsets real rate shocks to a larger extent in
the more active regime and raises the probability that future inflation
will be below threshold (triggering the less active policy). Consequently,
larger shocks are required to keep the probability of switching to the
more active regime constant as a2 rises. The presence of a more active
regime, and a threshold rule for switching to it, changes expectations so
that the economy spends more time in the less active regime. These ex-
pectations formation effects underlie the asymmetric distribution of in-
flation in figure 6.4.
In general, a state where inflation is above threshold and the current
real rate shock is positive results in agents placing little probability mass
on the adoption of the less active regime anytime in the near future. In
such a state, expectations closely resemble those in a fixed regime set-
ting, where agents place zero probability on a change.Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 361
6.5 Threshold Switching in a New Keynesian Model
We now turn to assess the implications of endogenous regime switch-
ing within a conventional new Keynesian model, as described in Wood-
ford (2003). The log-linear consumption Euler equation and aggregate
supply relations are:
xt = Etxt+1 - <j-
l(it - Etirt+1) + gt, (13)
TTf = p£tTTt+1 + KXt + Ut/ (14)
where aggregate demand and supply shocks follow:
with 0 :< p^ < 1 and 0 < pu < 1. Innovations to the exogenous shocks have
doubly truncated normal distributions with mean of zero, and variances
d
2g and <s
2u. For illustrative purposes, we use a conventional calibration:
P = 0.99, (o = 0.66, a = 1, pg= pu = 0.9, oj = a^ = 0.025, where 1 - <o is the
fraction of firms that reset their price each period, following Calvo
(1983) pricing. This calibration implies K = 0.18.
6.5.1 Monetary Policy Specification
This section focuses on a monetary policy process where the current
regime depends on lagged inflation, and policy responds to contempo-
raneous inflation, as in the Fisherian model. The policy rule, in terms of
deviations from the deterministic steady-state, is:
h = <VV
The coefficient on inflation is a function of the inflation threshold and
lagged inflation.
as = [1 - /(<*,_! > -rr*)]a0 + I[irt_1 > TT*K,
wither > ao> 1.
6.5.2 Supply Shocks
Figure 6.7 reports the contemporaneous response of inflation to supply
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Figure 6.7
Contemporaneous response of inflation to supply shocks in the new Keynesian model
Note: Threshold switching and fixed regime with less active (a0 = 1.5) and more-active (ar
= 3).
threshold and triggers less active policy at t (solid line), and one that ex-
ceeds the threshold and triggers the more active regime at t (dotted-
dashed line). For contrast, the figure also plots the contemporaneous im-
pacts of supply shocks on inflation when regime is fixed and less active
(a0 = 1.5, o's) and when it is more active (at = 3, x's). The inflation
threshold is set to zero, which is consistent with the steady-state infla-
tion rate around which the model equations are linearized.
The figure highlights the expectations formation effects that affect the
equilibrium. Consider the solid line, which corresponds to below
threshold Trf_v so policy is in the less-active regime at t. Positive supply
shocks raise inflation but only slightly more than they would in a fixed,
more active regime, and raise it much less than in a fixed, less active
regime. The certainty that regime at t + 1 will switch to being more ac-
tive dampens inflation even when the prevailing regime is less active, so
the expectations formation effects are given by the vertical distance be-
tween the o's and the solid line. Expectations formation effects arising
from the probability of switching back to less active policy in periods
t + k, for k > 1, make the solid line lie above the x's—the more active fixed
regime.
1
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Parallel reasoning applies to negative supply shocks. When inflation
is above threshold at t - 1 (dotted-dashed line), so policy is more active
at t, the deflationary shock triggers the expectation of less active policy
at t + 1: inflation falls by more than it would if more active policy were
permanent (vertical distance between dashed lines and x's). But infla-
tion also falls by less than it would under a fixed, less active regime be-
cause of the probability regime will switch back to a more active stance
in subsequent periods.
In this purely forward-looking model, expectations formation effects
are quantitatively significant. If agents know that policy next period will
be more (less) active, then the current equilibrium will more closely
mimic the equilibrium with a fixed more- (less-) active policy, even
when current policy is less (more) active.
6.5.3 Asymmetric Equilibrium Distributions
Asymmetry arising from endogenously switching policy is apparent in
impulse responses. Figure 6.8 reports the responses for output, inflation,
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Figure 6.8
Responses to positive and negative supply shocks in the new Keynesian model with
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supply shocks, starting from the more active regime initially. In the fig-
ure, the positive supply shock's impact on inflation is offset by monetary
policy to a larger extent than is the negative supply shock. Positive
shocks raise inflation and cause agents to increase the probability they
attach to monetary policy remaining in the more active regime.
The negative supply shock produces a kink in the period following
the initial shock. Expectations prior to the supply shock were placing
roughly equal weight on future monetary regimes. Following the nega-
tive supply shock, agents revise their expectations, placing more weight
on the less active monetary regime since the probability of inflation ex-
ceeding its threshold in the near future is relatively low. The effects of
the revisions of expectations towards the more accommodating mone-
tary regime are realized the period following the shock, causing a fur-
ther drop in inflation and the kink that is apparent in the figure.
6.5.4 Output and Inflation Thresholds
Flexible inflation targeting central banks operate under a legislative
mandate that specifies multiple objectives—price stability, stable
growth, high employment, safe payments systems, and so forth. The
Swedish central bank, for example, is instructed that "without prejudice
to the price stability target, [it] should furthermore support the goals of
general economic policy with a view to maintaining a sustainable level
of growth and high rate of employment" (Sveriges Riksbank 2006,2).
Flexible inflation targeting can be modeled by extending the preced-
ing analysis to make the switch in policy rules depend on both inflation
and output gap thresholds. The second threshold builds additional non-
linearity into the response surfaces for inflation and output. The mone-
tary rule is given by:
aoiT( if TT(_1 < 77* and xt_1 > 0
it = aoirt + 70xf if irt_1 < IT* and xt_^ < 0 , (18)
OL-^t if TTf_x 5: TT*
where 70 > 0 and ax > a0 > 1. If inflation exceeds its threshold, regardless
of the level of output, the central bank responds aggressively to inflation
and essentially disregards output gap fluctuations (the "without preju-
dice to price stability" mandate). In states when inflation is below its
threshold, the monetary authority turns to output stabilization objec-Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 365
tives, while still responding actively to inflation (the "maintain growth"
mandate). When the output gap is negative, the monetary authority re-
sponds to the output gap by lowering rates; when it's positive, the mon-
etary authority does not respond to output fluctuations, reflecting a
preference to let the boom continue, so long as inflation remains con-
tained.
Figure 6.9 plots two response surfaces for inflation against lagged in-
flation and the contemporaneous supply shock. The shaded response
surface is for states with xt_x < 0, and the solid white surface is for states
with xt_x > 0. In the state with the negative output gap, the monetary au-
thority adjusts the nominal rate to stabilize output (a positive coefficient
on the output gap term in the policy rule). In states when inflation is be-
low its threshold, the shaded surface indicates that policy does not ag-
gressively offset supply shocks to stabilize inflation; this appears in the
steep portion of the surface in this state. When inflation exceeds its
threshold, the two response surfaces connect since the rules in this state
are the same. If inflation is below its threshold and output is above its
threshold, then the monetary authority does less to stabilize output. In
Supply shock Inflation {tf J
Figure 6.9
Contemporaneous response surface for inflation as function of past inflation and current
supply shock
Note: Inflation and output gap thresholds. White surface is states with xw a 0; shaded sur-
face is states with xM < 0.366 Davig and Leeper
this state a positive supply shock drives up inflation and drives down
output, but the monetary authority responds only to inflation, not out-
put. In contrast to the case when output is below threshold, a positive
supply shock drives up inflation and drives output down further; but
there is a more aggressive interest rate response that stabilizes output.
6.6 Threshold Switching and the Preemption Dividend
Central banks aim to strike preemptively by aggressively increasing in-
terest rates in response to latent future inflation. Federal Reserve behav-
ior in 1994 is an example of such a strike: rapid increases in long-term
bond yields were viewed as reflecting expectations of higher future in-
flation, despite relatively docile contemporaneous inflation. Goodfriend
(2005) describes this episode as an inflation scare, and argues it is an il-
lustration of a successful preemptive strike against inflation, based on
subsequent realizations of low inflation, the flattening out of the yield
curve, and the decline in survey measures of expected inflation through
1995 (Clark 1996).
Establishing and maintaining the central bank's credibility as an in-
flation fighter is central to Goodfriend's argument that preemption is
good policy. By demonstrating its willingness to act boldly to combat in-
flation, even before it shows up in headline measures, a central bank can
anchor inflation expectations. As Bernanke (2004) emphasizes, preemp-
tion was a hallmark of Federal Reserve policy under Alan Greenspan.
While it is possible to model preemptive actions in fixed regime mod-
els as an intervention on exogenous shocks to the monetary policy rule,
as Leeper and Zha (2003) do, it is difficult to see how that approach can
have the lasting effects on expectation formation that Goodfriend em-
phasizes lie at the heart of combating inflation scares. Interventions on
shocks can shift conditional expectations, but they cannot affect expec-
tations functions; they generate direct effects, but no expectations for-
mation effects. Discrete shifts in policy rules that affect expectations
functions seem to be an integral part of Goodfriend's study.
To model a preemptive strike, we need an environment in which ex-
pected inflation can rise in response to a shock. The canonical new Key-
nesian model (of the previous sections) produces rapid adjustments to
shocks, so any persistence in output and inflation arises from serial cor-
relation in the exogenous shock process. The hybrid new Keynesian
model (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans 2005) introduces backward looking elements to behavior thatEndogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 367
permit inflation and output to exhibit the hump-shaped dynamics often
found in VAR studies. When shocks generate a steadily increasing path
of inflation, the monetary authority is presented with the opportunity to
respond more aggressively than normal to rising forecasts of inflation.
The Phillips curve from the hybrid new Keynesian model is:
TT( = (1 - ujTTt_t + ^EtTTt+1 + \Xt + Ut, (19)
where TT^ enters due to the assumption that firms that cannot reopti-
mize their pricing decisions, simply index their nominal prices to past
inflation. The consumption Euler equation is:
xt = (1 - a)x)Vl + <*xEtxt+1 - a~\Rt - £tTT(+1) + gt. (20) The shocks (ut and gf) are i.i.d., have means of zero, and obey a doubly
truncated normal distribution. The parameter cox is an index of internal
habit formation.
A preemptive strike calls for a different rule in certain states. States
that imply high and rising current inflation, coupled with rising ex-
pected inflation, trigger a more aggressive monetary policy rule. Let the
vector of current and lagged endogenous variables at t be denoted by £t
= (TT(, xt, 7Ttl, xt_t), and define the policy process to be:
, (21)
ir, it e Yt
where ax > a0 > 1. The inflation-scare state (Yt) that generates a preemp-
tive policy switch is defined as:
Yt = (£ I irt > 0, IT, > irt_a, Etirt+1 > ir(). (22)
The conditional expectation of inflation that enters the preemptive state
(Yt) is both the central bank's and the private sector's rational expecta-
tion formed conditional on policy specification (21) and (22), and the
economic structure in (19) and (20), along with the distribution of the
shocks.
Expressions (21) and (22) combine a simple feedback rule with for-
ward looking threshold switching criteria to produce a forecast based
policy process. In practice, most central banks follow forecast based
policies (Bernanke 2004; and Svensson 2005), so the specification in ex-
pressions (21) and (22) bring the paper's analysis closer in line with ac-
tual policy behavior, rather than the backward looking thresholds con-
sidered above.368 Davig and Leeper
We choose parameters in line with estimates from the literature in or-
der to gauge the quantitative impact of preemptive action on inflation
and output. Parameter values for the Phillips curve are consistent with
estimates in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2005), where w^ = 0.65 and
X = 0.03. For the consumption Euler equation we use cr"
1 = 0.16 (Wood-
ford 2003, 341), and wx = 0.52 (Dennis 2005) indicates a substantial de-
gree of habit persistence. In this exercise, normal policy sets a0 = 1.5, and
the preemptive policy sets ax = 5.
To generate hump-shaped responses, we focus on the demand shock
(gt), which produces a peak response in inflation one period after the
shock. This calibration, together with i.i.d. shocks does not produce
hump-shaped responses to cost shocks (ut). In this case, disturbances
to the Phillips curve can never trigger a preemptive switch in regime
because they do not produce inflation paths that satisfy the criterion
Because the switch to more active preemptive policy at time t is trig-
gered by the state at t and its implications for inflation at t + 1, the
regime at t + 1 is not known with certainty, as it was in the previous
threshold examples. In fact, with i.i.d. shocks and the present calibra-
tion, which generates a response that peaks the period after the shock,
agents expect the more active policy to be in place only at time t.
Using the baseline parameter values, figure 6.10 shows impulse re-
sponses to a demand shock realized in period t = 5 under the endoge-
nously switching preemptive policy (solid line), and compares them to
the fixed regime policy (dashed line).
1
2 The fixed regime policy uses a0
= 1.5. The demand shock generates a delayed rise in inflation, where the
peak occurs the period following the shock under both policies. Under
both policies, the shock raises inflation and creates an expectation of
higher future inflation. This triggers a preemptive rise in rates that par-
tially offsets the subsequent rise in inflation and reduces output.
What does implementing a preemptive, threshold switching policy
buy the monetary authority? This question is answered by isolating the
expectations formation effects that arise under the preemptive policy,
but are absent from the fixed regime. Figure 6.11 mimics the shock in-
tervention exercises in Leeper and Zha (2003) to create a sequence of
i.i.d. policy shocks (e() that allow the fixed regime policy (it = ctoirt + £,)
to exactly reproduce the interest rate path that the preemptive switching
policy implements (bottom panel). In the first two panels we see that un-
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Figure 6.11
Modeling preemptive policy in fixed- and in threshold-switching regimes.
Note: Figure feeds i.i.d. policy shocks into the fixed regime policy rule to reproduce the in-
terest rate path in the switching model. Fixed regime sets a = 1.5; preemptive switching
policy sets a0 = 1.5 and ax = 5.370 Davig and Leeper
icy is more effective than fixed regime policy (dashed lines) and inflation
rises by much less. The figure makes apparent that in the case of a de-
mand shock, output is stabilized also.
The magnitude of the total preemptive dividend for inflation—de-
fined as the difference in the areas under the two inflation responses in
figure 6.11—varies with agents' expectations of policy regime in periods
after the initial disturbance. Expectations of future regimes, in turn, vary
with the size of the initial demand shock: the larger the shock at t, the
higher the probability that the preemptive state will be realized at t + k,
and the larger are the expectations formation effects. This is shown in
figure 6.12, which reports the long-run effect on the price level of a de-
mand shock at t of a size given by the x-axis under preemptive policy
(solid line), and fixed regime less active policy (dashed line). As in fig-
ure 6.11, i.i.d. policy shocks are added to the fixed regime policy to
match the interest rate path under switching. The long-run preemption





































Preemption dividend as a function of size of demand shock.
Note: Plots the total long-run effect on the price level for any given sized demand shock for
preemptive threshold switching policy (solid line) and fixed regime with a = 1.5; pre-
emptive switching policy sets a0 = 1.5 and 04 = 5. Fixed regime adds i.i.d. shocks to pol-
icy rule to match interest rate path, as in figure 6.11.Endogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 371
shock, and can be quantitatively significant when demand shocks are
large.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
Endogenous switching of the monetary authority's policy rule carries
important implications for how private agents form expectations. This
paper has employed threshold switching as a simple method for endo-
genizing policy regime changes, which has the appeal of resembling ac-
tual policy behavior in stylized form. Under threshold switching, where
policy rules change when endogenous variables cross specified thresh-
olds, symmetric shocks have asymmetric effects and the policy process
generates quantitatively significant expectation formation effects. A
preemptive policy rule highlights the implications expectations forma-
tion effects have on equilibrium outcomes. A monetary authority that
stands ready to aggressively raise interest rates in response to forecasts
of rising inflation can shift expectations, enhancing the effectiveness of
efforts to stabilize inflation and output following demand shocks when
compared to a fixed regime policy. The reduced volatility of inflation fol-
lowing a demand shock is referred to as the preemptive dividend.
This line of work raises issues for further study. First, to what should
the benefits of preemptive policy be compared? This chapter contrasts
the effects under preemption to those under a simple, time-invariant
Taylor rule. In keeping with the second-best policy perspective, it is in-
teresting to contrast welfare under preemption with threshold switch-
ing to "optimal implementable" policy rules, as in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007).
1
3 Implementable rules are constrained to make policy in-
struments respond to observable variables, rather than to exogenous
disturbances.
A second issue emerges from the observation that (in this chapter),
preemptive threshold switching appears to offer a free lunch. It reduces
the volatility of output and inflation following demand shocks, but is
not triggered by supply shocks for which the preemptive policy would
not uniformly reduce volatility. The difference arises because supply
shocks, in the calibration we used, do not generate hump-shaped re-
sponses that would induce policy regime to change. Ultimately, the ex-
istence of humped responses is an empirical question. The present work
suggests that the answer to the question could have some practical im-
plications for the behavior of monetary policy.
Endogenous regime change represents a new mechanism by which372 Davig and Leeper
expectations formation matters in determining the impacts of monetary
policy. Given the magnitudes of expectations formation effects that
emerge from conventionally calibrated new Keynesian models with
threshold switching, conducting monetary policy to manage expecta-
tions is potentially quite powerful.
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Notes
1. There is also work that assumes that policy behavior switches exogenously among dif-
ferent exogenous rules for the evolution of policy variables (Andolfatto and Gomme 2003;
Leeper and Zha 2003; Davig 2004; and Owyang and Ramey 2004).
2. Some work examines one-time, permanent endogenous regime changes (Sims 1997;
Daniel 2003; and Mackowiak 2006).
3. This distinction follows the taxonomy in Leeper and Zha (2003).
4. See Orphanides and Williams (2005) for a model of preemptive policy in a learning en-
vironment.
5. The phrase "respond systematically more aggressively" may seem redundant. We use
it to emphasize that the central bank is not raising the nominal interest rate because of the
realization of an additive shock. Instead, it is changing the function that maps economic
conditions into policy choices.
6. To focus on endogenous policy actions, in most of the paper we dispense with the pol-
icy shock.
7. The rule in equation (4) is written in terms of percentage deviations from steady-state.
Underlying equation (4) is a rule in levels of variables with a state-dependent intercept
that varies to keep the deterministic steady-state constant across regimes.
8. The variance of the shock (o^) is also important. For simplicity, this dimension is not an-
alyzed.
9. The graph is drawn for p = 0.01; when p = 0 the model collapses to the trivial solution
IT, = 0.
10. Although the figure is drawn for particular values of lagged inflation—Tr(_, =
±0.37434—the magnitude of IT,,, is unimportant for the relative position of the solid line.
Expectation formation effects are generated by the likelihood of a change in future regime,
which depends on the sign of TTM, not its magnitude.
11. There is some empirical evidence supporting this. Based on VAR evidence, there is a
broad consensus that demand shocks tend to produce humps in output and inflation (Gali
1992; Leeper, Sims, and Zha 1996). The evidence on whether supply (or cost) shocks alsoEndogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 373
produce humps, particularly in inflation, is more mixed. Gali (1992) finds they do not,
while Ireland (2004) finds that they do.
12. The nonlinear endogenous switching model has a stochastic steady-state—defined as
the state the economy converges to when all shocks are set to zero—that differs from the
linear model (where the steady-state is zero inflation and zero output gap). For compari-
son, the impulse responses are reported with the non-zero steady-state swept out of the
nonlinear model. Because the stochastic steady-states for inflation and output are below
zero, the figures understate the actual difference between policies.
13. In linear frameworks, the fully optimal monetary policy is linear in the exogenous
shocks. Clearly, endogenous switching policy cannot improve on optimal policies.
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Appendix
Numerical Solution Method
Threshold switching induces nonlinearity into each model that requires
the use of numerical methods to obtain a solution. We use the monotone
map algorithm, as in Coleman (1991), which is an iterative method that
constructs decision rules over a discretization of the state space. To ini-
tialize the algorithm, we use the solutions from each model's fixed
regime counterpart, but also check that the final solution is not sensitive376 Davig and Leeper
to initial conditions by pertubating these initial conditions. The final so-
lution is invariant with respect to perturbations in the initial rules, sug-
gesting the solution is locally unique.
As an example, consider the new Keynesian model with threshold
switching and supply shocks. Implementation of the algorithm begins
by taking the initial rules for inflation and the output gap, h™(ut, TT^) =
Trt and h
x(ut, TT^) = xt, and substituting them into the functions describ-
ing private sector behavior and policy, yielding:
xt = Et[h*(ut+V irf)] - v-% - Et[fr{ut+V IT,)]}, (Al)
>nt = £Et[h-"(ut+v ir,)] + KXt + ut, (A2)
where ut is a zero mean, IDD random variable with a doubly truncated
normal distribution and variance of a





aSi = [1 - !(<*,_, > 0)]a0 + IK^ > 0]ar (A4)




 = / ^(W/ vl)h
x(u, irt)du — a~




irf = P J (j> (u; crl)h
x(u, Tct)du + KXt + ut, (A6)
a
where 4>(-) is the normal density, a = -3CT
2, and b = 3a
2. Expectations are
evaluated using trapezoid integration, so:
/ l)Hu, Ttt)du = !L\fz + 2ft + ... 7fl_x +/£], (A7)
/ lMu, Ttt)du = ^\f*0 + 2fl + ... 2/^ +fN], (A8) a L
where/]' = <!>(«,.; o-
2,)/^^.,^),/* = (f)(w;.; CT
2)/Z
X(W,., IT,), h = (b-a)/N, ut = a +
hi, and N is the number of nodes. Linear interpolation is used to evalu-
ate h^iUj, TTt) and h'"(ui, irf) for i = 1,..., N inside the integral. The rele-
vance of threshold switching appears when evaluating the integral, sinceEndogenous Monetary Policy Regime Change 377
agents place positive probability on the set of shocks next period that
would trigger a different monetary policy in the future.
Again, the system is:
(/5 2ft 2fc/5)
cr~
= ^(/o + 2/T KXt
which is two equations with two unknowns, xt and irr The state vector
and the decision rules are taken as given when solving the system. The
system is then solved for every set of state variables over a discrete par-
tition of the state space. This procedure is repeated until the iteration im-
proves the current decision rules at any given state vector by less than
some convergence criterion, 8, set to le-8.Comment
Richard H. Clarida, C. Lowell Hartriss Professor of Economics at Columbia
University, and NBER
Motivation
As a practical matter, it makes sense to think about a threshold model as
being potentially relevant to describing actual monetary policy. While
the mechanism featured here is not entirely novel (it bears some resem-
blance to properties of the equilibrium in a target zone model), the mag-
nitude of the regime switching effect on current outcomes is large in the
calibrated model. Moreover, the inflation scare example near the end of
the chapter, in which policy becomes more aggressive when actual and
expected inflation are rising, produces the striking result that (in re-
sponse to a demand shock) inflation and the output gap are lower pe-
riod by period under the threshold rule than they would be under the
simple Taylor rule.
Basic Idea
In this economy, the central bank follows a version of a Taylor rule, but
it also gets more aggressive if inflation gets too high. It features a thresh-
old reaction function:
i = asir
where as = [1 - I(TT - l>Tr*)]a0 + I(TT - l>7r*)ar The authors then put this
into a (graduate) textbook model. Note that the equilibrium real rate is
missing from this Taylor rule. This is important because in a model with
demand shocks, there will be variations in the equilibrium real interest
rate that, were they to show up in the reaction function, could fully off-
set the demand shock effect on inflation or output. This is a model that
would feature exogenous persistence with a linear Taylor rule.Comment 379
Key Results and Intuition
Suppose the reaction function is linear and a = 1.5, then Phillips curve
shocks have measurable impact on inflation. Suppose now that policy is
linear and a = 3, then Phillips curve shocks have a much smaller effect
on inflation as would be expected. Now suppose as in Figure 6.7 of the
chapter, a0 = 1.5 when 7r_1 < 0, and switches to ax = 3 when TT_1 > 0. Now,
when Tr_a < 0, even though a0 = 1.5 in this region, the response to a pos-
itive cost shock is very close to what it would be in a linear model for a
= 3. Thus, the promise to be tough when inflation is high attenuates the
response of inflation to a cost push shock when initial inflation is low.
But this also goes the other way. When TT_1 > 0, even though a0 = 3 in this
region, the response to a negative (favorable) cost shock is very close to
what it would be in a linear model for a = 1.5.
If you stop and think about it for a moment, you realize this sort of ef-
fect is present in other models. For example, in a target zone model in
which monetary policy rule changes when the exchange rate e is equal
to eT (the band of the target zone), the effect of shocks on e is attenuated
when e < eT and money is following an accommodative rule. That this
effect is as large as it is here is surprising. The calibration says that a cen-
tral bank operating with a Taylor rule of 1.5 will have virtually the same
effectiveness against a positive inflation shock as a central bank operat-
ing with three, so long as it switches to three if inflation gets too high.
But is also goes the other way. It says that a central bank operating with
a Taylor rule of three will have the virtually the same ineffectiveness in
response to a negative inflation shock as a central bank operating with
1.5, so long as it will switch back to 1.5 if inflation gets too low.
A Richer Model
The inflation scare model featured in the next section of the chapter is
very well done. It features inflation inertia and habit persistence, and
adds a policy regime switch when TT > TT_J and ETT+1 > IT. With an infla-
tion scare reaction function, the central bank gets more aggressive when
inflation has been and is expected to be increasing.
The authors show that, in response to a demand shock with an infla-
tion scare reaction function, the output gap is smaller in each period and
inflation is lower in each period. This is accomplished with a preemptive
rate hike. Now this appears to be a free lunch, but the example would be380 Clarida
more convincing for a cost push shock. The reason is that a simple Tay-
lor rule can get to first best in the case of a demand shock (the omission
of the equilibrium real rate from the policy rule really matters here).
Final Thoughts and Questions
We know even in linear models that forward looking Taylor rules can
generate multiplicities if a is too large. My intuition is that multiplicities
could be prevalent for reasonable parameters, especially for the inflation
scare model. Also, since the macro model to which the threshold rule is
appended is standard and well studied, we know that these threshold
rules are neither optimal under discretion nor time consistent under
commitment.Comment
Jesper Linde, Sveriges Riksbank and CEPR
Introduction
This excellent chapter studies the effects of endogenous threshold mon-
etary policy rules (regimes). In this way, it extends previous work in the
literature, which has typically assumed that regimes change exoge-
nously.
1 There are also a few papers that examine the consequences of a
one-time permanent endogenous regime change; the chapter extends
this literature by allowing for the possibility of an arbitrary number of
future regime shifts. On the surface, the analysis and the results in the
chapter are so straightforward and well written that they almost appear
trivial. But, in fact, that is not the case, and anyone that has worked on
solving nonlinear models should appreciate the computational level of
sophistication, and how easily the results are communicated in the
chapter. The authors show that their simple threshold setup gives rise to
an equilibrium characterized by the following three features.
First, endogenous policy rule switching results in cross-regime spill-
over effects, i.e. the knowledge that the coefficients in the policy rule
may switch at some given future state affects agents decisions today.
A useful example is that a policy rule, which responds less than one-to-
one to inflation if inflation is below (above) a certain threshold, may still
give rise to a determinate equilibrium if the central bank can commit and
announce that it will respond more than one-to-one if inflation exceeds
(falls below) the threshold value. Consequently, even if a central bank
does not fulfill the Taylor principle for every state of the economy, the
policy setup may still result in a unique well-defined equilibrium be-
cause of the expectation formations effects induced by the fact that the
central bank will act according to the Taylor principle, if inflation (or
output) passes certain thresholds.
2 Thus, if a shock increases the like-
lihood of hitting the threshold in the policy rule, e.g. a switch from a pas-382 Linde
sive to a more activistic rule, this will affect agents' decisions via expec-
tations, although the active regime may never materialize.
Second, the authors' setup also implies that typical macroeconomic
shocks (like policy shocks) have nonlinear effects on the economy. They
cite an empirical literature which supports this property, or their model,
to build credibility for their modelling framework. But an important dis-
tinction is how the nonlinear effects of various shocks are generated. The
typical explanation is that they are due to nonlinearities in the structure
of the economy. In the present setup, all nonlinearities stem from the
threshold policy rule.
3
Third and last, the model is able to account for a preemptive policy
dividend. They define the preemptive policy dividend as the difference
in the inflation forecast, conditional on the same interest path for a fixed
policy rule regime and the threshold switching model in a situation
where inflation expectations are rising between period t and t + 1. The
given interest rate path in the fixed regime case is generated by injecting
policy shocks, and therefore has direct effects on the inflation forecasts.
But standard models with a fixed regime can never generate the expec-
tation formations effects that the endogenous threshold switching
model can generate. Hence, the ability of the central bank to credibly an-
nounce that it will change the policy response if inflations expectations
rise above a certain threshold, implies that the central bank does not
have to increase the interest rate as much as the fixed policy rule banker
to stabilize inflation in practice. The notion of a preemptive policy divi-
dend plays a central role in central bank thinking according to the au-
thors, and they cite work by Goodfriend (2005) which argues that the
increase in the Federal interest rate during 1994 was an example of a
successful preemptive strike, as inflation remained low and long-term
interest rates declined.
This chapter was enjoyable to read, and offers analysis of the basic
properties of threshold switching rules in a standard new Keynesian
model. There is little reason to disagree with their analysis. What is still
considered to be an open question is to what extent threshold switching
models represent a promising avenue to model monetary policy behav-
ior in macro models. The first issue discussed is whether threshold
switching rules, as modelled in this chapter, are an improvement to
standard exogenous regime switching models. Second, the model has
certain empirical implications, which will be compared with the data. So
far, (basically) every paper in the monetary policy literature has adopted
a fixed policy rule regime perspective (Christiano, Eichenbaum, andComment 383
Evans 2005; and Smets and Wouters 2003), and it is therefore of interest
to study the basic properties of the data in order to get a feeling for
whether the implications of the switching environment in the chapter
have strong empirical support or not.
4 Ultimately, for the ideas con-
tained in this paper to be really influential, the authors will have to pro-
vide empirical support for modeling endogenous regime switching
rules having an empirical advantage, as compared to what is currently
standard practice.
Endogenous Threshold versus Exogenous Regime Switching Rules
Throughout the chapter, it is assumed that the central bank can fully
commit to a policy rule of the following type:
it = K(St) + a(S()ir( + y(St)xt + 8t, (1)
where the notation K(S{), a(St), and -y(St) reflects that the coefficients are
functions of the state of the economy. For instance, the authors typically
assume that St = {irt, irt_lf TT*, xt}, where IT, is the inflation rate in period t, TT* the inflation target, and xt some measure of the output gap. A
simple example of equation (1) is as follows: suppose that K(S,) = y(St)
= 0 for all St, and that:
aK_, - IT*) = [1 - Iiix^ - -rr*)]a0 + [/(ir^ - <ir*)K, (2)
where 7 is an indicator function such that I^^ - TT*) = 0 if irt_1 - TT* < 0
and unity otherwise, and that a0 < ar The authors typically assume that
a0 = 1.5 and ax — 5 in their experiments. Until this work, the literature
with time-varying policy rule coefficients has worked with rules where
the switching between coefficients a0 and ax constitute exogenous
events. As noted by the authors in their introduction, the notion of ex-
ogenous switching is inconsistent with how we model monetary policy
as purposeful in modern macro models, because purposeful monetary
policy does not switch coefficients in Taylor-type rules at exogenous
events. But this viewpoint is stemming from a normative perspective.
From a more empirical perspective, it is not clear that commitment to
fixed endogenous thresholds is an improvement to exogenous Markov
processes for policy rule coefficients. It is not certain that central banks
would like to make such a commitment, and even if they did, it is not
clear that they would be believed to be credible among households.
However, both parties may be willing to accept the notion of time-
varying thresholds. A simple way of modeling this in equation (1)384 Linde
would be to assume that the thresholds follow exogenous Markov pro-
cesses. In terms of the example equation (2), it would have to be as-
sumed that the inflation target was time-varying, which I find to be a
very plausible assumption from a more positive perspective.
Now return to more normative considerations in association with dis-
cussing the preemptive policy premium. By adding a version of equa-
tion (1) to a standard new Keynesian type of model (Phillips curve for
irt, IS curve for xt), the authors demonstrate that the model can generate
a preemptive policy (PP) premium for aggregate demand shocks. For
supply shocks, the chapters setup does not give rise to a PP premium.
Setting aside the model-specific issue of whether it was actually demand
shocks in 1994 that were giving rise to the increase in expected inflation
and long-term interest rates, a more challenging problem for the litera-
ture on threshold switching rules is to set out an environment where it
is useful for the monetary policy authority to create PP premium. In the
linearized new Keynesian model economy, there is no preemptive pol-
icy dividend (linear model, linear policy optimal). Therefore, it would
be more convincing to do the experiment in an environment which
would rationalize the nonlinear policy response, i.e. change the model-
ling setup. Using a nonlinear structural model, or time-varying deep pa-
rameters or shock processes, offers one such opportunity. Alternatively,
the authors can motivate their setup by checking whether the threshold
switching rule performs better than the best-practice operational Taylor
rules in their model economy. To motivate the latter experiment, it must
be assumed that the central bank is not able to observe the shocks in pe-
riod t; it is only allowed to respond to variables known in period t-1.
5
Empirical Considerations
For reasons already discussed, it is believed that analyzing the empiri-
cal support for the endogenous threshold switching framework sug-
gested in the chapter is of key importance. In this section, the results of
some simple exercises will be provided in order to shed some prelimi-
nary light on this issue.
First of all, one may ask if there exists independent evidence that cen-
tral banks have asymmetric preferences over inflation and output. This
would provide a rationale for endogenous threshold switching policy
rules. The authors cite the work of Surico (2003,2007), who finds this to
be the case for the European area and the United States. A weakness of
this evidence is that neither the European area nor the United StatesComment 385
have been explicit inflation or output targeters during the sample period
under consideration, so it would be of interest to complement this evi-
dence by also analyzing other countries. An alternative approach would
be to contrast the fit of the type of threshold policy rules presented in the
chapter, with fixed regime rules. This is presumably difficult, because al-
lowing for interest smoothing provides a good fit in fixed regime rules,
both in the pre-1982 period and the post-1982 period (Sims and Zha
2006).
6
So what could then be done? One implication of the endogenous
threshold environment is that inflation distributions should be nonnor-
mal (see section 6.5.3 and figure 6.4 in the chapter). More specifically, the
inflation distributions should most plausibly be skewed to the left (i.e.
the mean should be lower than the median), because the central bank is
more willing to accept periods with lower inflation rates than periods
with higher inflation rates. In figure 6C.1, annualized inflation rates are
plotted in percentage units—that is 400 \n(PGDPt/PGDP^)—for the Eu-
ropean area, Sweden, and the United States. All three time series appear
to display a similar low frequency component, but there are consider-
ably more high frequency movements in the Swedish series, in particu-
lar during the preinflation targeting period. Figure 6C.2 displays his-
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Inflation Distributions in the U.S.
Note: unfiltered data (UFD_WS) whole sample, Deviation from HP trend (HPFD_WS),
Unfiltered data Greenspan period (UFD_GREENSPAN), Deviation from HP trend
Greenspan period (HPFD_GREENSPAN).
tograms for the U.S. inflation rates, and reports the Jarque-Bera test sta-
tistic for the null of the distribution being normal. The two diagrams to
the left show results for unfiltered inflation rates for two different
sample periods (the whole sample and the Greenspan period), while the
two diagrams to the right show results for Hodrick-Prescott (HP) fil-
tered inflation rates (i.e. a time-varying inflation target has been re-
moved). None of the distributions are normal, thereby supporting the
implications of the authors' model. However, as is evident from the un-
filtered data in particular, it is not the case that the distributions areComment 387














































skewed to the left, they are rather skewed to the right. The two diagrams
with HP filtered data are less skewed, but have rather fat tails which
leads to the rejection of the normality hypothesis.
7 By and large, Figure
6C.2 lends little support to the authors' model, unless one is willing to
assume that inflation dynamics is (to a relatively large extent) driven by
unforecastable shocks.
Another implication of the chapter's setup is that the one-step ahead
forecast errors for the interest rate in standard linear VARs should be au-
tocorrelated. This is the case due to the fact that if the policy response co-
efficients have changed over time (assuming that different regimes have
in fact materialized), the coefficients that are estimated in a linear VAR
will be a weighted average of the various rules that have been in place.388 Linde
As a consequence, the one-step ahead forecast errors will be autocorre-
lated. In particular, this should be the case during the preemptive strike
in 1994, which the authors argue to be an example where the policy rule
response changed. This implication is true regardless of how monetary
policy is identified. Moreover, but probably to a lesser extent, it is the
case that the one-step ahead forecast errors for the other variables in the
system should also be autocorrelated. Furthermore, the linear VAR
should underpredict the interest rate path during 1994, and overpredict
the future inflation rates during this episode according to the chapter
framework.
To shed some light on whether these empirical implications are borne
out by the data, two VARs have been estimated and used to compute
one-step ahead forecast errors and generate genuine pseudo out of
sample forecasts. The first VAR is the semi structural (ten variables) VAR
estimated by Altig et al. (2004), and the second is just a simple unre-
stricted (UR) trivariate VAR (quarterly growth rate in GDP per capita,
inflation, and the Federal Funds rate).
8
In figure 6C.3 the annualized residuals for output, inflation, and the
Federal funds rate are reported. As can be seen from the figure, and in
line with the implications of the chapter setup, the residuals for the Fed-
eral funds rate display the highest degree of autocorrelation. For the
whole sample period, however, the autocorrelation coefficient is close to
zero for both VARs, because of the large spikes during the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s. For the post-1982 period, the autocorrelation co-
efficients are about 0.34 and 0.20 according to the ACEL and UR VARs,
respectively. For the Greenspan period, they are both about 0.49, and
significant in the two VARs. So the Greenspan period offers support for
the chapter setup, but the post-1982 period does not to the same extent.
In figures 6C.4 and 6C.5,1 report the pseudo out-of-sample forecasts
for the Greenspan period for three horizons along with the actual out-
come.
9 Figure 6C.4 reports results for the ACEL model, and Figure 5 for
the unrestricted VAR. In both figures, output per capita and inflation
have been transformed to yearly growth rates. Both figures display an
increase in forecasted inflation during 1994, in particular at longer hori-
zons. Both models also underpredicted the rise in the Federal funds rate
(except the ACEL VAR at the two year horizon). So in this sense, both
models support the idea of a preemptive strike during 1994. However,
it is also clear from both figures that the forecast errors were not excep-
tionally large for the interest rate during this episode, which appears to
be an implication of the chapter framework.
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Figure 6C.3
Reduced Form Residuals for Selected Variables in the Altig et al. (ACEL) structural ten-
Variables VAR and an unrestricted (UR) trivariate VAR.
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Actuals (thick) versus Unrestricted 3-Variables VAR Forecasts (thin).
nor the conditional (VAR results) empirical exercises considered can be
said to provide strong support for or against the threshold switching
setup suggested in the chapter. Therefore, it will be interesting to follow
the results of more refined empirical work in this area.
Notes
1. See the literature cited in note 1 in the chapter.
2. Davig and Leeper (2006b) argue that this implies that the empirical findings by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000) (i.e. that the United States did not fulfill the Taylor principle dur-
ing the 1970s) cannot (without further analysis) be taken to imply that the Federal conduct
of monetary policy was an integral part of the great inflation.
3. See Jacobson, Linde, and Roszbach (2004) for an analysis where the effects of monetary
policy shocks are strongly state dependent, although the coefficients in the policy rule are
constant.
4. From a more practical viewpoint, the latter perspective is also important, given that few
(if any) central banks incorporate any sort of regime switching monetary policy behavior
in the new generation of monetary models.
5. This latter possibility is also noted in the chapter conclusions.Comment 391
6. From a theoretical perspective, there is a good reason to include lagged interest rates in
the policy rule, as interest smoothing is typically welfare beneficial in new Keynesian
models considered by the authors (Woodford 1999).
7. As might be conjectured from Figure 1, the results are very similar for Sweden and the
European area, and (therefore) no histograms are reported for those series.
8. Both VARs use data for the period 1959Q2-2003Q4. The Altig et al. (2004) VAR is semi-
structural because only three out of ten possible shocks are identified, and four lags are
used for both VARs.
9. With the terminology pseudo out of sample, it is meant that the one-quarter (t + 1), one
year (t + 4), and two year (t + 8) ahead forecasts are computed using VAR estimates that
are based on data up to period t. The first forecasting period is set to be 1987Q3.
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